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Using retrospective data on bequest receipts and wealth over two generations of rural Indian
households, we have estimated the effect of bequest receipts on the lifetime wealth accumulation of
recipients. We exploit the availability of data on two generations ofthe same household by estimating
a family fixed effects model that controls for unobserved, intergenerationally-persistent household
endowments. Our results suggest an adverse impact of bequest receipts on the wealth accumulation
of recipients. This effect is much more negative for the current generation of household heads than
for the previous generation, indicating that the disincentive effects associated with bequest receipts
have increased substantially over a generation. Such disincentive effects are consistent with the
commonly-observed phenomenon of "regression to the mean." The empirical results also show that
the positive association between schooling and wealth accumulation has strengthened substantially
over the course of a generation, implying rising returns to schooling.
1. INTRODUCTION
Although there is a large literature on what motivates parental bequests to
children (Tomes, 1981; Blinder, 1973; Menchik, 1979,1980; David and Menchik,
1980; Kotlikoff and Spivak, 1981; Bernheim et al, 1985), little is known about
how such bequests influence subsequent creation and accumulation of wealth by
recipients. Yet the relationship between wealth creation and bequests has an
important impact on the intergenerational transmission of income and wealth
inequality and of poverty.
A priori the impact of bequests on final wealth outcomes is not clear. There
are several reasons why bequests might not simply have a one-for-one impact on
the wealth of recipients. First, bequests can have a more than one-for-one impact
by enhancing recipient productivity at creating new wealth. Second, by having
disincentive (behavioural) effects (such as a reduction in labor supply or an
increase in consumption) that can reduce future wealth creation or accumulation
by recipients, bequests may have a less than one-for-one impact on final wealth.
Note: We thank the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the International Crops Research
Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) for financial support for undertaking this study.
Helpful comments by two anonymous referees and the editor of this Journal, Jere Behrman, Hans
Binswanger and Paul Taubman are gratefully acknowledged. The usual disclaimer/Applies.
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Parents seek to minimize the likelihood ofthe latter event, which is why in modem
societies they often " . . . establish trust funds that limit children's control over
resources and thus their opportunities to misuse them" (Pollak, 1987), and in
traditional societies parents bequeath their wealth in the form of relatively illiquid
assets (such as land). However, anecdotal evidence, as well as the often-observed
tendency of "regression to the mean," suggest that the disincentive effects of
bequests might not be trivial.'
Using a unique data set from rural south India, which reports retrospective
data on bequests and wealth over two generations, we estimate the effect of
bequests on the lifetime wealth of recipients. We exploit the availability on two
generations ofthe same household by estimating a fixed-effects model that controls
for unobserved intergenerationally-persistent wealth creation and accumulation
propensities. We also test for the intergenerational constancy ofthe bequest effect
on recipient wealth.
2. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Since our objective is not to understand why and how parents make bequests
to their children but instead to analyze the effect of bequests already made on
the wealth accumulation behavior of recipients, there is little need for a
Becker/Tomes-type formal parental utility-maximizing framework. The primary
mechanism by which bequests infiuence recipient behavior is by increasing the
recipient's lifetime wealth. Within an intertemporal utility-maximizing model of
individual behavior, this increase in full wealth will have several effects, typically
of opposite signs.
There will be a full wealth effect on lifetime consumption. Assuming nor-
mality of consumption goods, an increase in full wealth will serve to increase
the lifetime consumption of a recipient and, assuming no increase in the recipient's
wage income, lower his wealth accumulation.
An increase in full wealth brought about by an inheritance will also increase
the demand for leisure, and reduce the supply of labor, in all periods (assuming
normality of leisure). This will have the effect of lowering the wage income of
bequest recipients in each period, which, when combined with the increase in
consumption, will serve to lower savings and net wealth accumulation.
However, a recipient may increase his productivity, and thereby his lifetime
wage income, by investing a portion of the bequest proceeds in himself (viz, in
the form of such human capital as health or education). This might be especially
true in a traditional society, where farm productivity might be constrained by
poor nutrition and health. Strauss (1986) and Deolalikar (1988), among others,
have provided convincing evidence to show that the productivity of workers in
agricultural activities is influenced strongly by their nutritional and health status.
Increased labor productivity and lifetime earnings would have a positive ceteris
paribus effect on wealth accumulation.
'For instance, Menchik (1979) found that there was a 25 percent regression to the mean over
one generation of wealthy Connecticut households whose probate records could be located. This
parameter was obtained as the difference between unity and the elasticity of terminal child wealth
with respect to parental wealth (0.759).
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Additionally, the marginal return on wealth might itself increase with the
level of wealth either due to the existence of scale economies in income or wealth
production or because of capital market imperfections. For instance, if credit
markets are imperfect and there are increasing returns to scale in farm production,
a wealth bequest may enable a farm operator to acquire a contiguous plot of
land and enlarge the size of his farm and thereby exploit increasing returns to
scale. Similarly, if a recipient faces a credit constraint due to the lack of collateral,
a bequest may increase his access to credit, which in turn may strongly infiuence
his wealth accumulation pattern.
It is likely that the effect of a bequest on a recipient's behavior might also
depend upon the donor's motives. An unplanned bequest due to lifetime uncer-
tainty may have a different impact than a Becker-Tomes type bequest designed
to reduce the gap between generations or among siblings or a Bemheim-Schleifer-
Summers type strategic bequest resulting from a game between parents and
children. In fact, in the case of a planned parental bequest, one would need to
make a distinction between ex post and ex ante recipient behavior, since a recipient
may expect a parental bequest to be made and adjust his behavior accordingly
before actually receiving his inheritance. Unfortunately, data limitations prevent
us from making such a distinction.
Since the various effects of bequests on recipient accumulation behavior
discussed above are of different signs, a priori the sign of the bequest effect on
wealth accumulation by the recipient is indeterminate. The sign, as well as the
magnitude, of this effect can only be determined empirically.
3. DATA AND ESTIMATION
The data we use are part of the Village-Level Studies (VLS) panel data
collected by the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics
(ICRISAT) in rural semi-arid south India (Singh et a/., 1985). A total of ten
villages, deliberately selected to represent different agro-climatic zones in semi-
arid agriculture, were surveyed regularly in the VLS project over the period
1975-76 to 1984-85. A sample of 40 households (30 cultivating and 10 labor)
was selected from each village.^ Not all of the villages were surveyed during each
of the 9 years; some were added half-way into the project, while others were
dropped at that time. However, a total of 120 households from three villages
were surveyed in each of the 9 years. The VLS data contain detailed information
on farm management, income, consumption, time allocation and asset ownership.
It should be emphasized that the ICRISAT VLS sample of households is
definitely not representative of rural India or, for that matter, rural south India.
The sample villages were selected purposively on the basis of soil quality, rainfall,
and other agroeconomic considerations. Within the sample villages, as well, equal
representation of different farm-size groups was maintained resulting in an
^To ensure equal representation of different farm size groups, cultivating households were first
divided into three strata, with each stratum having an equal number of households. From each
stratum, 10 households were selected at random, thus ensuring an equal sampling fraction in each
farm size group. For labor households, a random selection was made from those who owned less
than 0.2 hectares of land and those whose main occupation or source of income was agricultural labor.
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oversampling of households at either end of the distribution (viz., agricultural
labor and large farm households).
In 1984, a special survey was undertaken, in which retrospective data on
marriage, inheritance, and intergenerational changes in land holding and wealth
were collected from the heads of all the sample households. Data were obtained
on the year in which the head's parents' property division took place and the
value of the parental bequests made to the ourrent head and all his siblings at
that time. However, since the regular VLS sample did not include siblings of the
head who did not reside in the same household as the head, no other information,
such as on their age, schooling and current wealth, is available for such siblings.
Hence, we have undertaken the analysis in this paper with bequest, wealth and
schooling data on only one child from a household of the previous generation
(viz., the current head of a VLS sample household).
In addition, the Retrospective Survey of 1984 obtained information on the
bequest received by the current head's father (viz., the former head of household)
at the time of his father's property division through specially-designed question-
naires that attempted careful reconstruction of important events in a family's
history. We have merged the retrospective data with cross-sectional information
for 1984 on the wealth and personal characteristics of current household heads.
Note that, although the regular VLS sample includes a total of 400 households,
retrospective data on bequests and parental wealth could not be obtained for 89
households. Our analysis is, therefore, based on 311 households for whom
complete data are available.'
The basic relation we wish to estimate is:
(1) Sf = a, + bBf -I- cEf + dAf + eZ, + ^ f, g =/(ather), c(hild),
where
Sf = total real wealth ofthe gth (g = father, child) generation ofthe ith household
less real value of bequest receipt (i.e., net real wealth accumulation or
lifetime savings);
Bf = bequest receipt in constant prices;
£f = schooling years completed;
Af = age; and
Zi = other household characteristics, such as caste, village dummies and a
dichotomous variable for agricultural households.
For the father of the current household head, all the variables, with the exception
of bequest receipt, are measured at the time of division of his property among
his children (i.e. at the time of his retirement as household head). For the current
head, all the variables, again with the exception of bequest receipt, refer to 1984
(viz., the time of the Retrospective survey). Bequests received by both fathers
' A comparison of the descriptive statistics for the entire sample of 400 households with those
for the subsample of 89 households who have missing data suggest that the latter group is not very
different from the general sample in terms of major household characteristics (such as current wealth,
age of the current head, etc.). Therefore, there is no reason to believe that our analysis based on 311
households is subject to sample selectivity bias.
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and sons were evaluated at the time of their respective fathers' property division."
All monetary values are expressed in 1984 constant prices.'
Schooling is included as a control variable, as it may be associated with
large productivity increases in income or wealth generation. Age is included to
analyze the life-cycle pattern of accumulation.* Finally, caste affiliation, occupa-
tion (viz., agricultural labor), and village dummies are also included as additional
determinants of wealth accumulation.
A discussion ofthe wealth accumulation variables used in estimating equation
(1) follows. Data on the total amount of wealth owned by the father ofthe current
household head at the time of division of his property was obtained as the sum
of bequests made by him to all his children plus any wealth retained by him for
their own use. As mentioned earlier, the Retrospective Survey of 1984 obtained
information (based on recall) not only on the bequest received by the then current
household head, but also on bequests received by the current head's siblings. In
addition, information was obtained on property retained, if any, by the parents
in their own names at the time of property division.^ The dependent variable in
relation (1) is formed by taking total parental wealth as defined above and
subtracting the bequest received by the father of the current head.* This gives us
the accumulation of wealth by the father over and above the inheritance he
received from his father.
The dependent variable for the son is the total value of wealth owned in
1984 by the household of which he was head (in 1984) less the bequests he
received from his father at the time of parental property division.' There is a
problem in using wealth data for 1984 to calculate the lifetime wealth accumula-
tion by sons. While the wealth variable for fathers is a measure of completed
lifetime wealth accumulation (since, by definition, none of the sons were house-
hold heads at the time of the 1984 survey), none of the children had completed
their asset accumulation period by 1984'". The average age of a household head
in 1984 was only 50 years, which meant that he had another 10.5 years of heading
the household (since the average age at which former household heads divided
••since most household heads in 1984 were males, we use the term "sons" and "children"
interchangeably.
'See text below for the price index used to compute real values.
*We also tried including a quadratic term in age to allow for a hump-shape life-cycle pattern of
accumulation. However, the coefficient on the squared term was consistently insignificant indicating
no significant nonlinearities in the age profile of accumulation.
'Sometimes parental property in rural India is divided among the children while both parents
are still alive. In such situations, the father ceases to be the head of his household, and typically
resides (with his wife) in the household headed by their eldest son. Very rarely do the parents retain
any portion of their wealth in their own names.
*The bequest received by the father is valued in 1984 prices before being subtracted from total
parental wealth at the time of property division.
'Generally, the law of equal sharing, not of primogeniture, is customary in rural India. Although
extended (or joint) households are common in rural India, quite often households break up at the
time of parental property division, with the brothers separating and taking equal shares in the father's
property. Although daughters are legally entitled for their shares in parental property according to
Hindu law, they rarely claim their portion unless they have no brothers. In a sense, however, a
daughter collects her share of the parental property in the form of a dowry that is generally paid at
the time of her marriage to the groom's household.
'"Most fathers of current household heads were not living in 1984. Those that were, were residing
with one of their children.
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their properties among their children and ceased to be heads was 60.5 years). To
control for incomplete wealth accumulation by current heads, we include the
number of years the current head has been household head as an independent
variable in relation (1). In addition, the age ofthe son in 1984 (as well as the
age ofthe father at the time of his retirement as household head), both ofwhich
are already included in relation (1), control for incomplete wealth accumulation
by sons.
A major empirical problem is the valuation of bequests received at vastly
different points in time in 1984 real values. The value in current prices at time t
of a past bequest is equal to
where t is the current year, t' is the year in which the bequest was received, p
represents the price level, r is the real interest rate, and B is the money value of
the bequest receipt. Thus, other things equal, a bequest which was received a
long time ago is more valuable than one of the same money value received
recently, not only because of generally rising price levels (inflation), but also
because more time has elapsed in which the earlier bequest can accumulate
compound interest.
Since no price indices exist prior to 1960 for the ICRISAT sample villages,
we have used the historical price of gold to calculate the value—in constant 1984
prices—of all past bequests and wealth. Despite its apparent arbitrariness, the
use of gold prices to deflate (or inflate) nominal values is appropriate for a
number of reasons. First, it is the only commodity for which price data are
available going back to the last century. Second, after land, gold is the most
important form in which rural Indian households have held (and continue to
hold) their wealth, largely because of its ease of liquidity and the absence of
capital markets. While land is a major asset, land transactions are rare in rural
India, with few plots ever changing family hands (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1985).
Under these circumstances, it is reasonable to expect that the decision to invest
in any asset is made by comparing its return to the returns from holding gold.
In other words, in the absence of capital markets, the price of gold functions
effectively as the real market rate of interest. Third, while the use of the gold
price as a deflator may produce a systematic bias in the context of a rapidly
growing economy (in which agricultural investment and technological oppor-
tunities were changing the price of land and other agricultural assets relative to
gold), the region under consideration (viz., semi-arid rural south India) is not
only one ofthe poorest in India, but also one ofthe most stagnant technologically.
Finally, by including the number of years elapsed between receipt of a bequest
and measurement of terminal wealth (viz., the number of years an individual was
or has been head of his household), we control for any compounding effects of
bequest returns that are not captured by movements in the price of gold over time.
The a,'s in relation (1) are unobserved household endowments that persist
over generations. These might include superior health or other hereditary endow-
ments that permit some households to consistently (from one generation to the
next) outperform others in generating income and wealth. The fixed effects could
also reflect the propensities of some households (say, of certain ethnic back-
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grounds) to save more out of given incomes. Finally, the fixed effects might also
represent locational advantages (such as regular rainfall or fertile soil) enjoyed
by some households." The failure to control for these unobserved household
effects will result in upwardly biased estimates of b, since better-endowed house-
holds are likely to make larger bequests to the next generation and also create
and accumulate more wealth in the current generation.
We control for unobserved household fixed effects by differencing equation
(1) across fathers and sons:
(2) ^Si = b^Bi + c^E| + d^A,+^,J.,,
where A is the difference operator (between father and son) (e.g. AS, = S{-S^).
The only problem with equation (2) is that it assumes constancy of the
structural parameters (viz., b, c and d) over a long period of time. It is quite
likely that parameters, such as the marginal propensity to save and the returns
to schooling, have changed substantially over a generation. Fortunately, there is
a relatively straightforward way of relaxing this restrictive assumption within a
fixed-effects framework. The following equation allows all parameters to vary
across fathers and sons:
(3)
Differencing equation (3) across fathers and sons yields:
(4)
where A is the difference operator as defined for equation (2). The appealing
feature of equation (4) is that it not only permits all coefficients to differ across
the two generations, but it also allows a direct test of the intergenerational
constancy of parameters. The coefficients on the levels variables (for the son)
can be interpreted as the intergenerational changes in parameter values, while
those on the differenced variables reflect parameters of the wealth equation for
the father.'^
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The variable means and standard deviations are reported in Table 1. Bequests
appear to have declined in magnitude (in real terms) over the two generations.
On average, current household heads and their fathers inherited approximately
similar amounts (Rs. 68,905 and Rs. 64,005, respectively, in 1984 prices) from
"Since there is very little migration in this part of India, locational advantages can persist over
generations.
'^Note that an alternative and ad hoc interpretation of relation (2) is that a well-educated son
whose father had no formal education is expected to do better (relative to his father's wealth
accumulation) than one whose father had the same level of education that he does, since the difference
in wealth accumulation behavior between father and son is posited to depend on, among other things,
the difference in their schooling levels. Relation (4) relaxes this constraint by postulating that a son's
success at wealth accumulation vis-a-vis his father depends not only on the additional education he
possesses relative to his father but also on his absolute level of education.
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TABLE 1
VARIABLE DICTIONARY: RURAL I N D I A N HOUSEHOLDS, 1984
Mean Std. Dev.
Current head of household:
Total wealth (1984 prices) in 1984"
Value of bequest received
Wealth accumulated up until 1984 over and above bequest
receipt
Year of becoming household head (also the year of father's
property division)
Schooling years
Age in 1984
Father of current household head:
Terminal wealth (1984 prices) at the time of property division
Value of bequest received
Lifetime wealth accumulated over and above bequest receipt
(1984 prices)
Schooling years
Age at the time of property division
Number of observations
53,925.0
68,905.0
14,623.0
62.0
2.4
50.0
94,550.0
64,005.0
30,171.0
1.0
60.5
311.0
73,665.0
144,513.0
139,491.0
13.0
3.2
12.0
168,722.0
112,994.0
119,070.0
2.3
10.3
"All values are in 1984 prices. See text for the deflator used.
their parents.'^ However, while fathers of current heads converted their inherit-
ance of Rs. 64,005 into a terminal wealth stock of Rs. 94,550 on average (reflecting
net wealth creation of Rs. 30,545) during their tenure as household heads, their
sons on average eroded the real value of their inheritance to Rs. 53,925 (reflecting
net wealth depletion of Rs. 14,980) in approximately 22 years as household heads.
To estimate equations (1) and (3), we have pooled the data for fathers and
sons. For equations (2) and (4) we have differenced all variables (except village
dummies, occupation and caste) across fathers and sons within the same house-
hold. Parameter estimates of equations (1) and (2) are reported in Table 2, while
those of equations (3) and (4) are shown in Table 3. We flrst discuss the OLS
estimates, and then indicate how the differenced estimates are different.
The pooled restrictive (equation 1) estimates suggest strong positive effects
of age, schooling and high-caste affiliation, but a negative effect of bequest
received, on lifetime wealth accumulation. The coeflicient on bequest is estimated
to be -0.56, indicating that, bequest recipients reduce their own lifetime wealth
accumulation by Rs. 0.56 for every additional rupee inherited. Thus, their total
lifetime wealth increases by only Rs. 0.44 for every additional rupee they receive
in bequest.
On allowing the parameters of the accumulation equation to vary across
generations (equation 3), a sharp difference in the accumulation behavior of
fathers and sons is observed. In particular, while the effect of inheritance on own
wealth accumulation was only -0.08 for household heads of the previous gener-
ation, the effect for their sons is as large as -0.87 ( = -0.08-0.79). There thus
appears to have been a sharp increase in the disincentive effects associated with
"All values referred to hereafter are in constant 1984 Rupees. Also, the discussion of bequest
and wealth values below relates to the mean characteristics of the sample.
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TABLE 2
LIFETIME REAL WEALTH ACCUMULATION BY C U R R E N T HOUSEHOLD HEADS A N D THEIR
FATHERS: POOLED OLS ESTIMATES, RURAL INDIA, 1984
Equation with Assumption of:
Independent Variable
Identical Parameters
for Fathers and Sons
Varying Parameters
for Fathers and Sons
Intercept
Dummy for son
Number of years as head x Dummy for son
Age
Age X Dummy for son
Schooling years
Schooling years x Dummy for son
Bequest received
Bequest received x Dummy for son
Dummy for high caste
Dummy for high caste x Dummy for son
Dummy for medium high caste
Dummy for medium high caste x Dummy for
son
Dummy for medium low caste
Dummy for medium low caste x Dummy for
son
Dummy for agricultural labor household
Dummy for agricultural labor household x
Dummy for son
R-Squared
F-Ratio
Number of observations
-61,867.1
(2.2)
-1,001.77
(3.4)
1,618.31
(4.7)
7,066.70
(4.5)
-0.56
(16.9)
53,646.84
(3.9)
17,576.24
(1.2)
5,048.44
(0.4)
29,680.94
(1.1)
0.37
22.98
675
-103,162.62
(2.6)
84,008.23
(1.7)
-22.66
(0.1)
1,782.73
(3.5)
-1,109.41
(1.6)
6,927.99
(2.9)
1,031.44
(0.4)
-0.08
(1.8)
-0.79
(13.0)
46,004.24
(2.6)
3,724.22
(0.2)
892.43
(0.1)
22,685.70
(0.9)
-4,860.31
(0.3)
14,481.48
(0.6)
48,563.62
(1.4)
-31,235.28
(0.7)
0.54
22.46
675
Note All variables, with the exception of bequests, are measured in 1984 for sons and at
the time of parental property division for fathers. For more precise definitions, see text. A full
set of village dummies were also included, but their coefficients are not reported owing to space
considerations.
bequests over the course of a generation. Estimates of equation (3) also indicate
that the slope of the age profile of wealth accumulation is much flatter for sons
than for fathers. Thus, holding other factors constant, sons do not seem to save
as much with age as their fathers did.
The primary effect of controlling for unobserved household endowments
(that are assumed to be invariant across generations of the same household)
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TABLE 3
LIFETIME REAL WEALTH ACCUMULATION BY CURRENT HOUSEHOLD HEADS AND THEIR
FATHERS: DIFFERENCED ESTIMATES ACROSS FATHERS AND SONS, RURAL INDIA, 1984
Independent Variable
Intercept
Son's number of years as head
Difference in age
Son's age in 1984
Difference in schooling years
Son's schooling years
Difference in bequest received
Bequest received by son
Dummy for high caste
Dummy for medium high caste
Dummy for medium low caste
Dummy for agricultural labor household
R-Squared
F-Ratio
Number of observations
Equation with
Identical Parameters
for Fathers and Sons
21,251.77
(1.0)
535.08
(0.7)
1,174.21
(1.8)
105.53
(0.0)
-0.74
(14.9)
0.42
56.34
311
Assumption of:
Varying Parameters
for Fathers and Sons
17,028.91
(0.3)
-400.41
(0.7)
610.24
(0.9)
28.21
(0.0)
-100.3
(0.0)
-5,628.25
/ 1 O\(1.8)
-0.16(2.7)
0.92
(13.5)
-3768.00
(0.2)
-19,091.70
(0.8)
-12,573.10
(0.6)
2,0052.93(0.6)
0.70
33.79
311
Note: All variables, with the exception of such time-invariant household characteristics as caste
and agricultural labor occupation, are differenced across fathers and sons. Further, all variables, with
the exception of bequests, are measured in 1984 for sons and at the time of parental property division
for fathers. For more precise definitions, see text. The coefficients on the differenced right-hand
variables can be interpreted as the relevant parameters for fathers, while those on the levels variables
(for sons) can be interpreted as the change in parameters over the two generations. To obtain the
relevant parameters for sons, the coefficient on the levels variable has to be subtracted from the
coefficient on the respective differenced variable. See relation 4. A full set of village dummies were
also included, but their coefficients are not reported owing to space considerations.
(equation (2)) is to reduce the magnitudes of almost all estimated coefficients.
This is a standard result of differencing (or fixed-effects estimation techniques),
and suggests that the unobserved household endowments, such as superior health
or other hereditary factors and locational advantages (such as regular rainfall of
fertile soil), are positively correlated with the included variables like bequests
and schooling.
As in the case of the pooled OLS estimates, the household-differenced
estimates of the flexible form (equation (4) of the wealth accumulation equation
differ substantially from those of the restrictive form. In particular, while the
restrictive form estimates indicate an effect of bequests on own wealth accumula-
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tion of -0.74, the flexible form suggests this effect to be -0.16 (significantly
different from zero) for household heads ofthe previous generation and -L08
(=-0.16-0.92) (significantly different from zero, but not from one) for their
sons.'* Thus, our most reliable estimates indicate fully compensatory behavior
on the part of bequest recipients of the current generation; in other words, the
own wealth accumulation of bequest recipients declines by almost one Rupee
for every additional Rupee received in the form of a bequest, so as to leave their
terminal wealth unchanged.
Estimates of relation (4) also indicate that, while the effect of education on
own wealth accumulation was not significantly different from zero for household
heads of the previous generation, it is large, positive and significant for their
sons. Thus, the returns to schooling have increased significantly over time, even
in the context of the rural sector.
Our empirical results imply a very sharp decline in the own wealth accumula-
tion efforts of the current generation of household heads with bequest receipts,
and are indicative of large (and increasing over time) disincentive effects associ-
ated with bequests. What could be some of these effects? A complete analysis of
these effects is beyond the scope of this paper, and we can only conjecture on
what these effects might be and why they may have increased over a generation.
In a situation of increasing demographic pressure on families, it is quite
likely that increasingly larger proportions of inherited wealth are used by house-
holds for satisfying their growing consumption needs, and smaller proportions
are devoted to investment and wealth accumulation. In the sample under consider-
ation, the average size of households has increased over a generation, implying
increased demographic pressure. At the same time, while the previous generation
generally experienced stable prices of assets, such as gold, land and cattle, the
last several decades have seen a sharp increase in the relative price of assets (to
consumption goods) in rural India. The ceteris paribus effect of /ising relative
prices of investible assets is generally to reduce asset accumulation and saving.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Using a unique retrospective data set from south India on bequest receipts
and wealth over two generations of rural households, we have estimated the effect
of bequest receipts on the lifetime wealth accumulation of recipients. We exploit
the availability of data on two generations of the same household by estimating
a household-differenced model that controls for unobserved intergenerationally-
persistent wealth-accumulation propensities. We also test for the intergenerational
constancy of the bequest effect on wealth accumulation.
Our results suggest an adverse impact of bequest receipts on the wealth
accumulation of recipients. This effect is much more negative for current heads
of households than for previous heads, indicating that the disincentive effects
'"•Note that the coefficients on the differenced right-hand variables can be interpreted as the
relevant parameters for fathers, while those on the levels variables (for sons) can be interpreted as
the change in parameters over the two generations. To obtain the relevant parameters for sons, the
coefficient on the levels variable has to be subtracted from the coefficient on the respective differenced
variable. See relation 4.
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associated with bequest receipts (such as an increase in consumption of goods,
services, and leisure) have increased substantially over a generation. Such disin-
centive effects are consistent with the commonly-observed phenomenon of
"regression to the mean," and imply that the interhousehold distribution of
bequests is more unequal than the interhousehold distribution of terminal wealth.
The empirical results also show that the positive association between school-
ing and wealth accumulation has strengthened substantially over the course of
a generation, implying rising returns to schooling, even in the rural areas of south
India.
Our study indicates a need for further research in this important area and,
in particular, for a better understanding ofthe exact reasons for and mechanisms
through which the 'returns' to bequests have fallen while those to schooling have
increased over a generation.
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